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Focus on Pay for Performance (in LMICs)
Problems of public health systems in countries with
limited resources
 Low efficiency
 Low (effective) coverage
 Poor accountability
 Low responsiveness
 High inequalities
Problems of public health systems in countries 
with limited resources
 Bureaucratic models of service provision
 Input-based funding – or payment mechanisms
 Health facilities paid based on N of staff, N of bed etc.
 Very rigid mechanisms
 Limited incentives to «productivity»
 Little autonomy to providers
Problems of public health systems in countries 
with limited resources
 Since 80s/90s traditional bureaucratic model of
public service provision challenged - New Public 
Management
 From low powered towards high powered
incentives
 Tackling information problems (principal-agent 
framework)
Problems of public health systems in countries 
with limited resources
Information problems:
 Problems in measuring health: e.g. length vs
quality of life
 Lack of information about the production
process – efficacy/effectiveness etc
 Information asymmetries (patients vs
providers vs third payers etc.)
Pay for Performance
 Results-based financing or P4P – “the transfer 
of money or material goods conditional on 
taking a measurable action or achieving a 
predetermined performance target”
 P4P uses financial incentives to align the interests
of principal and agent by paying for a specified
output or target
Pay for Performance
 Demand side – health service users -e.g. linking 
payments to the utilization of specific services
 Opportunidades programme in Mexico
 Janani Suraksha Yojana – conditional cash transfer to 
reduce maternal and neo-natal mortality 
 Supply side – providers - they receive additional 
payments for meeting population coverage 
targets for specific services
Pay for Performance
 Or combination of demand and supply side
 e.g. Safe Delivery Incentive Programme in Nepal in 
which cash payments are made to both women who 
deliver in health facilities and trained providers who 
attend deliveries, either at home or in a health facility
Pay for Performance – supply side
 P4P - organizational units are given substantial 
decision rights over their resources (i.e. 
autonomy) 
 They do not rely on hierarchical relationships but 
on contractual or regulatory ones
 Interaction through contracts requires that the 
steward or its proxy clearly define performance 
for each organizational unit
Potential of Pay for Performance
 Greater accountability
 P4P may be a powerful means to improve the way health 
facilities respond to users
 Empower consumers
 the community can help verify results and provide feedback on 
the quality of services received - patients “vote with their feet”
 Improving efficiency
 Implementation requires the Ministry of Health to clarify key 
health priorities to finance (allocative efficiency) 
 increasing the quantity and quality of services delivered for a 
given amount of money (technical efficiency)
Potential of Pay for Performance
 Allignment of partners
 It may better align donor initiatives with country frameworks
 The management of funds from global health initiatives and 
“verticalized” aid programmes present important challenges 
 it may facilitate the pooling of all financing sources, including 
the government budget and specific donor programme
 Increase funding to direct services
 Delivering results can also win the commitment of ministries of 
finance to fund the health sector
 Strengthened the position of the Ministry of Health vis-à-vis 
the Ministry of Finance by showing a clear link between 
funding and outcomes
Potential of Pay for Performance
 Practical implementation of more transparent 
public finance management 
 Public expenditure tracking surveys often find that resources 
allocated for service provision never reach the frontlines
 Direct transfer of resources to frontline providers, which may 
reduce leakages
Design features of P4P in health care
 Means of payment
 that recognizes the joint nature of production and encourages
teamwork (payments are to individuals, teams, or facilities)
 Form of payment
 that encourages increases in coverage, but not supplier
indiced demand
 Form and level of target: 
 how to provide encouragement to those facilities whose level
of performance is still low in absolute terms, but which have
seen a significant improvement
 how to encourage high performing facilities to continue to
improve
Design features of P4P in health care
 Share of remuneration that is performance
related
 large enough to induce effort and creativity in finding solutions
to service delivery challenges, but not so great that providers
bear so much risk that they withdraw from the process
altogether
 Method of verification of output
 independent groups to undertake independent
verification of performance? administrative costs of the
system
Challenges of P4P
 Tunnel vision and myopia: 
 providers may focus excessively on the service targets that
carry a financial incentive on short-term measures, to the
detriment of other services that are more difficult to measure
or require longer-term action
 Crowding out of altruistic incentives:
 providers who do not meet the performance targets may be
demoralized by the linking of financial payments to
performance, or financial incentives might undermine altruistic
ones
 Erosion of intrinsic motivation
Challenges of Pay for Performance
 Strategic behavior and gaming: 
 Risk that providers will engage in strategic behavior around
target setting –e.g. underperforming in the run-up to the
setting of performance targets so that their targets are easy to
achieve
 Risk selection or cherry-picking: 
 To dissuade enorolment of groups or individuals who might
undermine target achievement
 Corruption in performance measurement:
 Collusion between provders and those who are assessing
performance achievement, or deliberate manipulation and
misreporting of the data are used to measure performance
